We investigate the effect of securitization activity on banks' lending standards using evidence from the syndicated loan market. We find that banks more active at originating assetbacked securities also tend to price syndicated loans more aggressively. Large banks with relatively smaller securitization programs seem to be particularly aggressive when extending new loans. Over time credit standards loosened progressively in the run up to the recent crisis. Using a unique feature of our dataset, we can show that relative loan underpricing is more prevalent for loans kept in the banks' portfolios compared to those sold to other investors through securitization. Our results are consistent with the role of securitization leading to laxer credit standards although not necessarily outside the banking sector. (120 Words)
Introduction
Securitization is deemed to have been a major contributing factor to the 2007-2008 financial crises, or at least to have exacerbated underlying weaknesses (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011) .
Securitization has been suspected to fuel credit growth by contributing to lowering banks' credit standards. Yet, prior to the recent global financial crisis the usual view emphasized the positive role played by securitization in dispersing credit risk thereby enhancing the resilience of the financial system (Shin (2009) ). This was also the prevalent policy view, Alan Greenspan (2005) , for instance, argued that the use of credit risk transfer instruments, such as securitization, enabled the largest and most sophisticated banks to divest themselves of credit risk by passing it on to institutions with far less leverage. As a result, securitization activity was expected to make the financial system more stable as risk was more easily diversified, managed and allocated economy-wide. From the perspective of individual institutions securitization was expected to be employed by banks to manage and diversify more effectively their credit risk portfolio geographically or by sector. Even if the total risk remained within the banking sector, securitization was expected to allow banks to lower their overall risk profile due to diversification and more tradability of assets (Duffie (2008) ).
Consistent with these views, early empirical evidence found securitization to lower banks' risk levels.
Banks more active in the securitization market were also found to have lower solvency risk and higher profitability (Duffee and Zhou (2001) ; Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) ; Jiangli, Pritsker and Raupach (2007) ).
At the same time, there were growing concerns suggesting that securitization could compound adverse selection and moral hazard problems in banking leading to poorer screening standards as well as weaker monitoring of borrowers by banks. This would be the case, in particular, for banks more active in the securitization market which are actively selling to outside investors' part of their credit portfolio. Mostly building on this argument, there was a more skeptical view on the benefits of securitization and its possible negative impact on the stability of the financial system (Rajan (2006) ).
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It was also argued that securitization would not necessarily lead to credit risk diversification, but could promote the retention of risky loans and undermine overall credit standards (Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) ; Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) (2012)). On the other hand, Shivdasani and Wang (2011), Benmelech, Dlugosz and Ivashina (2012) , Casu, Clare, Sarkisyan and Thomas (2013) do not find any evidence that securitization led to risky lending activities.
We assess the impact of securitization activity on lending standards considering both the effect of securitization activity on lending standards at the bank and as well as the individual loan levels. This allows us to explore the link between securitization and lending standards further as we are able to distinguish not only whether banks involved in securitization activity have a different lending standards than those institutions not active on this market but also within the set of loans granted by each bank we are also able to disentangle whether those loans which are securitized are also differently priced than those which are not securitized.
Europe is a good laboratory to assess the impact of securitization activity on lending standards. First, the growth of the securitization market in Europe has been a recent and relatively sudden phenomenon. This stands in contrast to the US, where the introduction of securitization has been therefore much more progressive and continuous over time, strictly speaking securitization activity has been used as a technique for more than fifty years. The public euro-denominated securitization markets started very timidly in the late 1990s, and only took off significantly from 2004 to 2007, to suddenly contract afterwards. Securitization activity in the euro area has also been large in terms of the total credit amount securitized (Marques-Ibanez and Scheicher (2009) This is also helpful for our purposes as the existence of government 2 In 2006, just before the financial crisis, the annual net flow of euro-denominated asset-backed-securities (ABS) was above one-fifth of the bank loans granted to households and non-financial companies during that year). 3 In the United States the market for ABS started to develop by means of government-sponsored agencies such as the Federal National Mortgage Association, known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or Freddie Mac, created in 1938 and 1968, respectively. These agencies enhanced mortgage loan liquidity by issuing and guaranteeing, but not originating, ABS.
agencies might have an impact on banks' securitizing incentives. Third, Europe allows us to test the effect of securitization across countries so our results cannot be ascribed to any individual institutional or regulatory feature related to any given country. At the same time, since the introduction of the euro there was largely a single financial market both for syndicated loans and securitization activity in Europe so that our conclusions can be more easily generalized.
We pursue two approaches to test this link at European securitization market. Firstly we use a bank level analysis and turn to evidence from the syndicated loan market 4 and specifically test if banks more active in the securitization market price credit risk more aggressively (i.e. grant credit at lower yields). This approach gives the advantage of examining banks' lending standards with firsthand information from their primary activity of lending, taking into account bank, borrower and instrument conditions. This should, in turn, give an indication of banks' changes in risk taking appetite. Secondly we utilize a deal (i.e. loan) level based analysis using a unique and very broad dataset. This information, is not publicly available, but has been provided by the largest European trustees. This allows us to distinguishing those syndicated loan deals that were eventually securitized in a great deal of detail.
We utilize a set of alternative variables to proxy for securitization activity at the bank level.
Subsequently, we match this bank level information with deal level data from the syndicated loan market amounting to 84,926 syndicated loan deals/bank matched observations. We gauge the impact of European banks' securitization activity on loan spreads by controlling for other factors such as bank characteristics, loan terms and purpose, borrower credit quality and business sector as well as the macroeconomic environment.
We find that banks more active at originating asset-backed securities also tend to price syndicated loans more aggressively. Large banks with relatively smaller securitization programs seem to be particularly aggressive when extending new loans. Over time credit standards loosened progressively in the run up to the recent crisis. Finally, loan underpricing is more prevalent for loans kept in the banks' portfolios compared to those sold to other investors through securitization. 4 Syndicated lending, where two or more banks agree jointly to make a loan has evolved into one of the world's largest financial markets. In a typical syndicated loan, "arranger" (or "senior") banks are situated at the core of the process. They help to put together the deal at a given set of terms and sell parts of the loan to "participant" (or "junior") second tier banks, as well as other investors, assigning some of the loan to themselves. Participant banks do not normally negotiate directly with the borrowing firm, but rather have an "arm's-length" relationship acting through the arranger (Sufi (2007) ). The composition and structure of the syndicate can have an influence on loan pricing. In a bilateral loan the price is determined by a single lender depending on its information set about the risk of the borrower and the loan terms and conditions. In syndicated lending, the price of the loan is determined by negotiations between the arranger and the participant banks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature on the effects of securitization on lending standards and risk-taking behavior. Section 3 describes the data sources, provides descriptive statistics and explains the empirical methodology used in the analysis. The results of estimations are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Literature review
Traditional securitization can be broadly defined as the process whereby individual bank loans and other financial assets are bundled together into tradable securities, which are then sold on to investors. Securitization allowed banks to turn traditionally illiquid claims (overwhelmingly in the form of bank loans) into marketable securities. The development of securitization has allowed banks to off-load part of their credit exposure to outside investors thereby lowering regulatory pressures on capital requirements, raise new funds and increase lending further. Overall the advent of securitization changed banks' role dramatically from traditional relationship-based lending to originators and distributors of loans and had implications on bank's incentives to take on new risks. 5 Rapid developments in securitization markets altered banks' role. Banks have long been recognized as "special" because of their ability to act as intermediaries between borrowers and depositors and transform illiquid assets into liquid deposit contracts. Conventionally, bank lending was typically conducted on the basis of a bank extending a loan to a borrower, holding the loan on their balance sheet until maturity and monitoring the borrower's performance along the way. In this relationship-based model, banks reduced idiosyncratic risks mainly through portfolio diversification and performed the role of delegated monitors for less informed investors (Diamond (1984) ; Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) ; Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) ; Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) ).
Other studies questioned the effect of securitization on the screening and monitoring incentives of banks. The theory of financial intermediation has placed special emphasis on the role of banks in monitoring and screening borrowers thereby mitigating moral hazard between borrowers and lenders (Diamond (1984); Fama (1985) ; Boyd and Prescott (1986) ). By creating "distance" between the loan's originator and the bearer of the loan's default risk, securitization can potentially reduce lenders' incentives to carefully screen and monitor borrowers (Petersen and Rajan (2002)). As a result some researchers associate loan sales and securitization to looser credit monitoring incentives by banks ' (Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) Instefjord (2005) highlights that when the bank has access to a richer set of tools to manage risk than before; it behaves more aggressively in acquiring new risks. In this direction also, Haensel and Krahnen (2007) find that activity in the European collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market enhances the risk appetite of the using bank.
Looking at the pricing of securitized loans, Nadauld and Weisbach (2012) show that securitized loans were priced 17 basis points lower than un-securitized loans.
Other recent studies do not support the argument of securitization leading to risk taking of the banks. Benmelech, Dlugosz and Ivashina (2012) find that loans securitized before 2005 performed no worse than comparable unsecuritized corporate loans originated by the same bank.
Casu, Clare, Sarkisyan and Thomas (2013) conclude that the net impact of securitization on the risktaking behavior of issuing banks, and consequently on the soundness of the banking system, is ambiguous and will depend on the transactions structure.
Enhancement of risk appetite is also related to the regulatory capital arbitrage. Securitization has often been used by banks to lower their regulatory needs for costly equity capital charges related to loans on the balance sheet, thereby reducing the overall cost of financing (Watson and Carter (2006) ). However banks may have an incentive to securitize less risky loans thereby lowering their capital positions (Calem and LaCour-Little (2004) ). This behavior derives from the existence of high capital standards to exploit the benefits of securitizing assets to undertake regulatory capital arbitrage. Through securitization banks can potentially increase capital adequacy ratios without decreasing their loan portfolios' risk exposure. In other words, banks may securitize less risky loans and keep the riskier ones. Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Sanders (2005) empirically show that securitized loans have experienced lower ex-post defaults than those retained in portfolio.
Banks may also end up holding the riskier tranches of the securitized assets. In order to signal the quality of the securitized assets and align its interests with those of investors, the originator of the assets may retain part of the equity tranche on its balance sheet. The objective is to bridge asymmetries of information between originators and the final investor via the retention of lowest ranked (e.g. equity) tranche. This retention generally seen in practice is the result of a signaling equilibrium where the securitizing bank, in an attempt to signal the value of assets, retains poorer quality assets (Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) ; DeMarzo (2005); Instefjord (2005)). Holders of senior tranches are exposed to sizable "tail risk", i.e. the risk of very infrequent but catastrophic losses (Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2009) ).
While risk sharing within the financial sector (through securitization and derivatives contracts) reduces multiple inefficiencies, it can also amplify bank risks also at the systemic risk level (Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013) ). Allen and Carletti (2006) show that credit risk transfer could produce a reduction of welfare through creation of contagion in others. Wagner (2007) shows that an increased liquidity of bank assets achieved through securitization, paradoxically, increases banking instability and the externalities associated with banking failures as banks have stronger incentives to take on new risk. The reason is that securitization makes crises less costly for banks and, as a result, banks have an incentive to take on new risk offsetting the positive direct impact of securitization on bank stability.
In sum, this strand of the literature argues that securitization does not necessarily lead to unlimited risk transfer, promotes retention of risky loans and undermines banks monitoring incentives. Hence, it may weaken financial stability. Furthermore, the crisis has shown how the securitization market is heavily dependent on markets' perceptions and could be suddenly subject to illiquidity concerns from investors. Namely the consequences of the increased participation in bank funding by financial markets' investors and the large macroeconomic increases in securitized assets, often financed by short-term liquid liabilities, can led to acute liquidity crises. 
Methodology and data

Model
We use a bank level analysis to gauge whether banks that were active in the securitization market were more aggressive in loan pricing. We turn to evidence from the syndicated loan market and use the pricing of newly extended loans after securitization (measured as the spread charged) as measure of banks' risk appetite after securitization. In other words, we examine if banks that securitize the most were more aggressive in their pricing of loans. This allows us to investigate if banks active in the securitization market underprice the credit risk.
We rely on a linear model which explains loan spreads as a function of a number of risk factors (Carey and Nini (2007) ; Ivashina (2009)). Where Loan spread is measured as the spread on basis points over LIBOR. We use the all-in drawn spread (AISD) which measures the interest rate 8 spread plus any associated fees in originating the loan. 7 Thus, AISD is an all-inclusive measure of loan price which is expected to depend on borrowers, loan and macroeconomic characteristics as well as a variable accounting for the intensity of securitization activity (see below). We estimate the following model:
We utilize two set of alternative variables to proxy for the securitization activity of the banks: We account for bank specific characteristics by taking into account banks' size (measured as total assets), bank capital (measured as the ratio of total equity capital to total assets) and banks' profitability (return on assets). We also control for factors related to the syndicated loan deal including loan size, maturity and the presence of guarantees and collateral. Loan size is measured as the natural logarithm of the syndicated loan's size. Maturity is the duration of the loan in years.
Loans with duration shorter than 1 year are classified as short term and loans longer than three years are classified as long term. Guarantee is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed and 0 otherwise. Collateral is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there is any collateral pledged for the loan and 0 otherwise. Loan purpose is a set of dummy variables depending on the purpose of the loan which can be classified as general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance.
We also account for borrower credit quality and its industrial sector via a first set of dummy variables reflecting the credit rating of the borrower issued by the credit agencies (Moody's, Standard and Poor's -S&P -or Fitch) 8 at the time of issuance. Business sector is a set of dummy variables related to the business of the borrower (i.e. construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport). Finally we also control for the macro environment including Year dummy variables.
Data sources
We construct our dataset by combining data from three different sources. Securitization data are obtained from Dealogic (Bondware), a private commercial data provider, and completed with data from Standard and Poor's (S&P), a large private rating agency. We look at individual deal-by-deal issuance patterns from euro-area originating banks. The advantage of using data on securitization activity from Bondware and S&P is that the name of the originator, date of issuance and deal proceeds are registered. We include funded public ABS securities as well as cash-flow (balance-sheet) In constructing the dataset, we include all syndicated loans for which the main variables on loan terms and borrower details are present. Secondly we extract the reported participant European banks names that have been involved in these loan syndicates and obtain information on their characteristics from Bankscope on a yearly basis. Subsequently, we obtain the amount of securitization activity yearly for all banks in our sample from our sample on securitization activity from the Dealogic (Bondware)/Standard and Poor's data on securitization. We finally match each syndicated loan data with participant banks' financial information on a yearly basis. For example if 
Loan i's terms and borrower's data for 2007 + Bank X's data for 2006 Loan i's terms and borrower's data for 2007 + Bank Y's data for 2006 Loan i's terms and borrower's data for 2007 + Bank Z's data for 2006 Loan j's terms and borrower's data for 2008 + Bank X's data for 2008 Loan j's terms and borrower's data for 2008 + Bank Q's data for 2008
Overall this process generated 84,926 deal-matched observations. Data resources do not have a unique identifier to match the three databases and all the data is hand-matched by a laborious visual inspection of bank names. We present a summary descriptive statistics related to the sample in Table   1 .
Results
Baseline model
We run the model presented in section 3.1 using OLS and OLS fixed effects estimators. We introduce controls for bank characteristics progressively. Results are presented in Table 2 . We employ two securitization activity variables separately in alternative models and look at the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated loans. We find the coefficients of securitization active to be significant and negatively associated with loan spread in OLS models.
Banks that are active in the securitization market are pricing loans cheaper in comparison to banks that do not securitize assets. Being more or less active does not change the signs of the coefficients estimated by OLS models. Both group of banks charge lower spreads when compared to banks that are not active in the securitization market. Similarly, controlling for bank characteristics does not change the results in OLS models. In contrast, significance of the coefficients change when we utilise OLS fixed effects estimators. We still observe a statistically significant coefficient, albeit at a lower level, for the securitization active variable. The coefficient for more active loses its significance while the negative relationship between less active and loan spread remains valid. The results show that banks that are more active in the securitization market do not price loans differently than non-active banks. On the other hand, banks that are less active in loan securitizations appear to underprice loans compared to non-active banks.
We interpret our findings in relation to the signaling argument. Banks that are more active in the securitization market are the ones issuing CLO regularly. These banks' continuity of business in terms of generating fee income and business model depends on maintaining the quality of the assets underlying these CLOs. Hence they are less likely to lower lending standards through underpricing loans that may be securitized. Our findings support this argument and we do not find evidence of underpricing by banks that are more active in the securitization market. However, banks which are less reliant on the securitization market and do not need to signal quality to the market, are more likely to underprice credit risk. We find that these banks in fact lower lending standards and do not reflect the real risk of the loans by charging lower spreads. They are less likely to align interests with investors of securitized assets.
Bank size effects
Next we investigate whether bank size has an influence on underpricing. As banks become larger and complex they deemed systematically important and receive implicit government guarantee (toobig-to-fail argument) on their debt. These banks have an incentive to take on extra risk, which further increases the systemic risk. This was one of the main problems faced by European Table 4 . By adding the control variables progressively; we do not see a significant coefficient for securitization active for small banks in any of the models. Similarly, variables less active and more active are also not significant for smaller banks. The results show that securitization-active smaller banks were not engaging in risk taking through underpricing regardless of their activity volume in the securitization market.
In contrast, for larger banks we find a negative and statistically significant relationship between the securitization active variable and loan spread. Larger banks seem to be charging lower spreads when extending new loans if they are active in the securitization market. This finding can also be based on the fact that larger banks might be better able to diversify or manage credit risk; therefore, servicing cheaper loans. To see whether this may be the case we utilize the securitization activity volume variables. The last two models in Table 4 show the results of the estimations. We find the coefficient of less active carries a negative sign and it is statistically significant. We report an insignificant coefficient for the variable more active. Overall the possibility of risk diversification argument does not seem to be valid as it is not observed in all large banks. Our findings show that larger banks that are less active in the securitization market are more likely to drop lending standards by underpricing loans.
The effect of pre-crisis period
We also consider how banks underpricing behavior due to securitization might change in relation to the business cycle as there is strong evidence suggesting that lending standards change with macroeconomic conditions (Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) ). It is particularly important to 9 We group the banks by using the median assets size.
observe bank behavior for the period prior to the recent credit crisis since many advocate that banks increased their risk-taking behavior in many fronts, especially lowering their lending standards coinciding with increases in securitization activity in the years leading up to the crisis (Maddaloni and Peydró (2011)). We observe bank behavior in the pre-crisis period using another dummy variable, pre-crisis period. This variable equals to 1 for years 2005, 2006 and for the first half of the 2007 in the build-up to the crisis and 0 otherwise. To carry the analysis further, we interact the pre-crisis dummy variable with the securitization variables. Results are presented in Table 4 .
We find a negative and statistically significant relationship between pre-crisis period and loan spread. It is evident that banks were underpricing loans prior to the financial crisis compared to the rest of the analysis period. This is consistent in all specified models. The results indicate that during two years of economic expansionary period before the crises banks were more likely to underprice credit risk possibly linked to declines in risk aversion which coincided with periods of better economic prospects. We do not find interaction variables to be significant. Subsequently, we examine the impact of the crisis in relation to bank size. As above we divide the banks as small and large and estimate the models. We present results in Table 5 . The findings are consistent for the precrisis period dummy variable where we report a negative and statistically significant relationship. In estimations for small banks we observe a significant and negative coefficient for the interaction variable pre-crisis * securitization active. However, this variable loses its significance when we control for bank effects. Overall we do not find concrete evidence that banks that were more active in the securitization underpriced loans prior to the financial crisis.
Securitized vs. un-securitized loans
We expand the analysis using the individual deal level data by distinguishing syndicated loans that were eventually securitized by the originating banks. By doing so we are interested in finding whether loans which were eventually securitized were also more aggressively priced than unsecuritized ones. Due to data limitations, here we only use the observations for the loans that were issued between 2005 and 2009. Hence the number of observations drops in the models. We estimate the baseline models separately for securitized and un-securitized loans. Results are presented in Table 6 .
As reported above we do not find a significant coefficient for the securitization active variable in any of the specifications. However, the variable less active is significant and negatively related to loan spread for both securitized and un-securitized loans. We also observe that the coefficient of this variable is larger for un-securitized loans. Even though we look at a smaller sample of loans the findings are still consistent that banks that are less active in the securitization market were underpricing loans. Furthermore, it is evident that these banks underprice unsecuritized loans more in comparison to the loans they securitized eventually.
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So far the results discussed above reveal that banks are not necessarily underpriced loans if they were active in the securitization market. Secondly, we find that large banks that are less active in the securitization are more likely to underprice loans. Thirdly, it is evident that eventually securitized loans are priced less aggressively than un-securitized loans. In other words, bank that are less active in the securitization market were more likely to underprice loans that they kept in their portfolios rather than loans that were sold to other investors through CLOs. To narrow down the analysis in relation to our main findings we focus on larger banks and their pricing behavior of securitized and un-securitized loans. Results are presented Table 7 . Findings remain valid even though we utilize a smaller number of observations. We find that larger banks which are less active in the securitization market underprice loans whether they are securitized or un-securitized later. In large banks underpricing is more prevalent when loans were kept in banks' books. Hence, the coefficient of the variable less active, showing the negative loan spread due to securitization, decreases from -11.02 basis points to -21.64 basis points for the loans that are un-securitized.
Subsequently we examine the impact of pre-crisis period on loan underpricing only for large banks by utilizing crisis dummies and interaction variables. Results are presented in Table 8 . The results show that for securitized loans the variable less active loses its significance and the pre-crisis dummy variable is found to be negatively related to the loan price. We find that interaction variables pre-crisis * less active and pre-crisis * more active are insignificant for securitized loans. On the other hand, the coefficients of less active and pre-crisis period dummy variable are statistically significant and both are negatively related to spread for the loans kept in banks' books. These results are consistent with earlier findings.
We report noteworthy findings regarding the estimations for un-securitized loan sample.
Firstly we report a significant and negative relationship between less active and loan spread. More importantly we observe a larger (and significant) coefficient for pre-crisis period dummy variable.
The interaction variable pre-crisis period * less active is also significant. Although it is reported to be positive, the impact of the interaction variable on the dependent variable should be interpreted by combining the coefficients of variables pre-crisis period, less active and pre-crisis period * less active [for the most controlled estimations this would be (-28.93 Instefjord (2005)) arguing that securitization leads to poorer quality assets which makes the banks riskier. This is due to signaling concerns of the banks about the quality of the securitized loans.
Banks retained lower quality loans to be able to originate CLOs backed by better quality ones.
However, this strategy was followed only by those banks that utilized the securitization market sporadically or by banks issuing CLOs with smaller volumes. Banks that are more active in the securitization market, concerned about the continuity of business, maintained the quality of the assets underlying these CLOs. These banks were not underpricing loans whether they were securitized or un-securitized eventually.
Conclusions
Securitization has been under the scrutiny for fuelling credit by lowering credit standards leading to increased banks ' and borrowers' leverage (Shin (2009); Farhi and Tirole (2012) ). We explore the nexus between securitization and bank risk-taking by examining the pricing behavior of European banks when extending new loans after securitization. We pursue two approaches to examine the risk-taking behavior. We use a wide sample of 84,926 matched bank-loan observations to gauge the impact of European banks' securitization activity on loan spreads after controlling for lender, borrower and loan characteristics. Furthermore, for a subsample of loans we analyze a unique dataset that allows us to distinguishing those syndicated loan deals that were eventually securitized.
We find that in general banks that were active in the securitization market were pricing loans cheaper in comparison to banks that did not securitize assets. However, this behavior depends on size of the bank and volume of its securitization activity. The evidence shows that larger banks which are less active in the securitization market charge lower spreads when extending new loans.
On the other hand, large banks that are more active in the securitization market do not price loans differently than non-active banks. Our findings also show that during two years of economic expansionary prior to the crises, when securitization activity soared in Europe, these banks were underpricing credit risk even more. Furthermore, controlling for loan and borrower characteristics, we find that loans that were un-securitized carried lower spreads compared to eventually securitized loans. In other words, bank underpricing is more prevalent for loans that they kept in their portfolios rather than loans that were sold to other investors through securitization. Overall, the evidence suggests relaxation of lending standards via charging lower spreads prior to the financial crisis by banks which were active in the securitization market. This implies that some banks, relying on securitization, lowered their lending standards much more aggressively for the period prior to the recent financial crisis.
As discussed above we consistently find that banks that were less active in the securitization market were more likely to underprice loans. These findings are in line with earlier arguments suggested by the literature. For example we find that banks are more likely to take on risk through underpricing loans and both Instefjord (2005) and Haensel and Krahnen (2007) argue that banks behave more aggressively in acquiring new risks when they have access to securitization market.
Our findings also support the literature (Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) ; DeMarzo (2005); Instefjord (2005)) that argues that securitization leads to poorer quality assets which makes the banks riskier. This probably is due to signaling concerns of the banks about the quality of the securitized loans. Banks retained lower quality loans to be able to originate CLOs backed by better quality ones. However, this strategy was followed only by those banks that utilized the securitization market sporadically or by banks issuing CLOs with smaller volumes. Banks that are more active in the securitization market, concerned about the continuity of business, maintained the quality of the assets underlying these CLOs. These banks were not underpricing loans whether they were securitized or un-securitized eventually.
From a policy perspective, an important implication is that that securitization could be increasing the cyclicality of credit. Our results suggest that banks more active in securitization activity relaxed credit standards above their peers during periods of economic expansion.
Securitization could therefore be fuelling, under certain circumstances, excessive loan growth which could potentially have financial stability implications. Policy measures aiming at smoothing the credit cycle could be beneficial in this respect. More generally, regulatory actions improving the incentive structure within the securitization market that reduces the incentives for under pricing credit risk are also warranted. T his table presents coefficient estimates for OLS regressions (with and without fixed effects) estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated loans. Independent variable is the loan spread measured as basis points over LIBOR. Securitization active takes the value of 1 if the bank securitised any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Less active takes the value of 1 if the bank's securitization level is below the median value of all banks' securitization volume and 0 otherwise. More active takes the value of 1 if the bank's securitization level is above the median value of all banks' securitization volume and 0 otherwise. Log loan size is the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan. Maturity short takes the value of 1 if the loan maturity is less than one year and 0 otherwise. Maturity long takes the value of 1 if the loan maturity is more than three year and 0 otherwise. Guarantees takes the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed by a third party and 0 otherwise. Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan has collateral and 0 otherwise. Log total assets is the logarithm of bank's total assets. Equity to total assets is the level of bank's total equity divided by total assets. Return on assets is the net income divided by total assets. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance. Borrower credit quality is controlled for using credit rating assigned to the borrower in the year when the loan is borrowed. Business Industry is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as contraction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport. Year fixed effects is controlled for the years 2000 to 2009. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The impact of banks' securitization activity on loan price T his table presents coefficient estimates for OLS fixed effects regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated loans. Independent variable is the loan spread measured as basis points over LIBOR. Securitization active takes the value of 1 if the bank securitised any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Less active takes the value of 1 if the bank's securitization level is below the median value of all banks' securitization volume and 0 otherwise. More active takes the value of 1 if the bank's securitization level is above the median value of all banks' securitization volume and 0 otherwise. Bank size is grouped by using the median assets size. Log loan size is the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan. Maturity short takes the value of 1 if the loan maturity is less than one year and 0 otherwise. Maturity long takes the value of 1 if the loan maturity is more than three year and 0 otherwise. Guarantees takes the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed by a third party and 0 otherwise. Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan has collateral and 0 otherwise. Log total assets is the logarithm of bank's total assets. Equity to total assets is the level of bank's total equity divided by total assets. Return on assets is the net income divided by total assets. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance. Borrower credit quality is controlled for using credit rating assigned to the borrower in the year when the loan is borrowed. Business Industry is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as contraction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport. Pre crisis bank securitization activity and loan price with fixed effects estimators T his table presents coefficient estimates for OLS fixed effects regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated loans. Independent variable is the loan spread measured as basis points over LIBOR. Securitization active takes the value of 1 if the bank securitised any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Less active takes the value of 1 if the bank's securitization level is below the median value of all banks' securitization volume and 0 otherwise. More active takes the value of 1 if the bank's securitization level is above the median value of all banks' securitization volume and 0 otherwise. Pre-crisis period takes the value of 1 for the loans issued in 2005, 2006 and the first six months of 2007 and 0 otherwise. Log loan size is the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan. Maturity short takes the value of 1 if the loan maturity is less than one year and 0 otherwise. Maturity long takes the value of 1 if the loan maturity is more than three year and 0 otherwise. Guarantees takes the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed by a third party and 0 otherwise. Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan has collateral and 0 otherwise. Log total assets is the logarithm of bank's total assets. Equity to total assets is the level of bank's total equity divided by total assets. Return on assets is the net income divided by total assets. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance. Borrower credit quality is controlled for using credit rating assigned to the borrower in the year when the loan is borrowed. Business Industry is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as contraction and property, hightech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport. Year fixed effects is controlled for the years 2000 to 2009. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Table 5 Bank size and the impact of securitization activity on loan price during the pre crises period T his table presents coefficient estimates for OLS fixed effects regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated loans. Independent variable is the loan spread measured as basis points over LIBOR. Securitization active takes the value of 1 if the bank securitised any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Less active takes the value of 1 if the bank's securitization level is below the median value of all banks' securitization volume and 0 otherwise. More active takes the value of 1 if the bank's securitization level is above the median value of all banks' securitization volume and 0 otherwise. Bank size is grouped by using the median assets size. Pre-crisis period takes the value of 1 for the loans issued in 2005, 2006 and the first six months of 2007 and 0 otherwise. Log loan size is the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan. Maturity short takes the value of 1 if the loan maturity is less than one year and 0 otherwise. Maturity long takes the value of 1 if the loan maturity is more than three year and 0 otherwise. Guarantees takes the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed by a third party and 0 otherwise. Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan has collateral and 0 otherwise. Log total assets is the logarithm of bank's total assets. Equity to total assets is the level of bank's total equity divided by total assets. Return on assets is the net income divided by total assets. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance. Borrower credit quality is controlled for using credit rating assigned to the borrower in the year when the loan is borrowed. Business Industry is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as contraction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport. Year fixed effects is controlled for the years 2000 to 2009. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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